Office of military propaganda

Despite continually sniffing the air for bullshit, even I didn't have my bullshit detector turned up high enough. Sure, I was skeptical of uniformed military analysts, mostly just for their personal and institutional loyalties. I didn't expect to find bias consciously cultivated by the Pentagon through selection, access, and conflicts of interest.

By early 2002, detailed planning for a possible Iraq invasion was under way, yet an obstacle loomed. Many Americans, polls showed, were uneasy about invading a country with no clear connection to the Sept. 11 attacks. Pentagon and White House officials believed the military analysts could play a crucial role in helping overcome this resistance.

Torie Clarke, the former public relations executive who oversaw the Pentagon’s dealings with the analysts as assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, had come to her job with distinct ideas about achieving what she called “information dominance.” In a spin-saturated news culture, she argued, opinion is swayed most by voices perceived as authoritative and utterly independent.

So, they set out to create the perception, and goddamn the reality. They ran the government like a business, and that meant they needed referenceable accounts, no matter what sweeteners they needed to get those references.

At the Pentagon, members of Ms. [Torie] Clarke’s staff marveled at the way the analysts seamlessly incorporated material from talking points and briefings as if it was their own.

“You could see that they were messaging,” Mr. [Brent] Krueger said. “You could see they were taking verbatim what the secretary was saying or what the technical specialists were saying. And they were saying it over and over and over.” Some days, he added, “We were able to click on every single station and every one of our folks were up there delivering our message. You’d look at them and say, ‘This is working.’ ”

It seems as if the New York Times is finally asking how they got so snookered by the Bushist propaganda during the rush to war. It's a belated but good start.

Update: Fine phrasing at Whiskeyfire:

[I]f you want a war and know perfectly well you can't convince anyone that it's a good idea unless you're dishonest about it, you probably should rethink your belligerence.